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 Probablement, tout et tous – et nous-mêmes – ne sommes-nous que des rêves 
immédiats de la divine Matière: 
 Les produits textuels de sa prodigieuse imagination. 
 Et ainsi, en un sens, pourrait-on dire que la nature entière, y compris les hommes, 
n’est qu’une écriture; mais une écriture d’un certain genre; une écriture non-significative, du fait 
qu’elle ne se réfère à aucun système de signification ; qu’il s’agit d’un univers indéfini : à 
proprement parler immense, sans mesures. 
 Tandis que le monde des paroles est un univers fini. 
Francis Ponge, “À la rêveuse matière.”1 
 
Δοκεῖ δὲ μέγα τι εἶναι καὶ χαλεπὸν ληφθῆναι ὁ τόπος.  
Aristotle, Physics IV, 212a2 
 
“Es scheint aber etwas Großmächtiges zu sein und schwer zu fassen, der Topos” – das heißt 
der Ort-Raum.  
Martin Heidegger, “Die Kunst und der Raum”3 
 
The Imagination 
Philippe Lynes 
In inquiring into what could constitute a new concept for materialism and its contributions 
to the study of our biopolitical futures, certain questions immediately impose themselves, 
namely concerning the status of new materialism’s belonging to the lineage of dialectical 
materialism, and the latter’s to dialectics, that is, to the work of the Concept as the 
consummation of Western metaphysics. How one inflects this belonging could thus result in 
a number of heterogeneous understandings of the stakes of a new materialist Concept; either 
in its dialectical sense or, following another strain of what has been called a ‘non-dialectical 
materialism,’4 corresponding to the Deleuzian task of philosophy as the creation of new 
concepts. Coole and Frost, in the first anthology of new materialist literature, indeed see the 
movement’s task as “creating new concepts and images of nature that affirm matter’s immanent 
vitality.” 5  On this interpretation the alliance between new materialism and biopolitical 
thought seems a heavenly match brought down to earth; building from the Nietzschean 
inversion of Platonism and affirming the activity, agency, capacity, dynamism, force, 
intensity, liveliness, power, vibrancy and vitality of matter hand in hand with affirming the 
creative dimensions of ζωή or Life itself, the materialist dimensions of living labour and the 
biopolitical production of new subjectivities.6 Such an affirmative biopolitics would thus 
correct Marx’s critiques of materialisms hitherto and, taking up materialism anew as praxis 
and (post)human subjectivity, fulfill the revolutionary promise of actively transforming the 
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world rather than passively interpreting it detailed in his 11th thesis on Feuerbach. But what if 
one does not only stand in a relation of creation, labouring, production or re-production regarding 
the image or imagination? And what if matter came to be understood as what ultimately 
imposes a limit to, an interruption of the imagination as power or production? What sites of 
resistance to biopolitics might thus open up? What role might art have to play therein? 
 In this essay, I want to point to another possible interpretation of the stakes of 
aligning the Concept with biopolitical thought that could give one much to dwell on with 
respect to new materialism if read in terms of the corrective outlined above. In an essay 
entitled “Form and Fashion,” Jacques Derrida draws on Alain David’s thesis that the worst 
biopolitical oppressions in racism and anti-Semitism would have something to do with a 
notion of ‘form’ surviving through Husserl and Heidegger; “form itself, the fascination for 
the form, that is to say for the visibility of a certain organic or organizing contour, an eidos, if 
you will, and therefore an idealization, an idealism even as it institutes philosophy itself, 
philosophy or metaphysics as such.”7 Derrida distinguishes two responses to this formal 
Gestell. The first would be that of a material phenomenology as proposed by Michel Henry, 
bearing a strong resemblance to the materialist affirmative biopolitics outlined above: a 
transcendental vitalism emphasizing “pure ‘transcendental life,’ absolute immanence, (...) the 
pure life of the ‘living,’ (...) the immanence of ‘feeling oneself alive.’”8 Coole and Frost 
indeed point to an alliance between new materialism and new vitalism regarding “emergent, 
generative powers (or agentic capacities) even within inorganic matter, ... eschew[ing] the 
distinction between organic and inorganic, or animate and inanimate, at the ontological 
level.”9 However, Derrida expresses some serious reservations before such an approach, 
reminding us (without feeling the need to elaborate) of its grave political complicities and 
dark historical connotations. Heidegger also reads Nietzsche’s vitalization of all organic and 
inorganic matter as wholly complicit with the culmination of Western thought in 
technological enframing or positionality and the reduction of beings as a whole to their 
calculability and use-value, deeming Nietzsche “the most unrestrained [zügelloseste] Platonist 
in the history of Western metaphysics.”10 The question for both Heidegger and Derrida 
seems to be if simply inverting an opposition and affirming the material over the ideal or 
formal is sufficient, or whether a deeper destruktion or deconstruction of this opposition in 
relation to its outside or impossibility is required. In “Form and Fashion,” Derrida thus 
outlines a second response to this enframing by form: that of an interruptive transcendence 
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as found in Blanchot and Levinas, one that would discover the underside of Concepts and 
their relation to Form. To go to the underside or the beyond of the concept would 
impossibly invent “the transcendence of the other that the concept, as it traditionally gives 
itself to science and philosophy, tends to fix within the objectivity of a form.”11 
 What I’ll try to develop in this essay with respect to imagination constitutes an 
engagement with a non-dialectical materiality as the underside of the Concept, of 
philosophical discourse and its closure in technobiopolitical positionality. As is well known, 
Derrida claims in a 1971 interview that everything he writes can be called materialist if matter 
is understood as radical alterity or heterogeneity, a third term beyond philosophical dualisms: 
“the insistence on matter as the absolute outside of oppositions, the materialist insistence (in 
contact with what ‘materialism’ has represented as a force of resistance in the history of 
philosophy) seems necessary to me.”12 Less well-known is that this interview took place only 
a few months after a 1970-1 seminar entitled Theory of Philosophical Discourse: The Conditions of 
Inscription of the Text of Political Philosophy – The Example of Materialism,13 of which only the third 
session has been published as the third and fourth sections of his 1993 essay “Khōra.” The 
stakes of this latter text are recalled in Spectres of Marx in calling for “a materialism without 
substance: a materialism of the Khōra.”14 Plato’s khōra (commonly space or site, in Greek), 
despite being seen by many as inaugurating the philosophical notion of matter or ‘hylē’ via 
Aristotle’s interpretation is never in fact referred to as ‘hylē’ in Plato’s Timaeus (the word hylē 
itself rarely appears in Plato).15 What khōra gives to be thought with respect to matter itself 
resists its incorporation into philosophical discourse, a dark matter for metaphysics, invisible 
and amorphous, remaining accessible only through the dream or a bastardized myth.16 I 
hope to demonstrate that the imagination, itself often a certain ‘third term’ with respect to 
philosophical discourse, allows one a certain engagement with this materialist resistance, with 
promising insights into our post-biopolitical futures. 
 Derrida’s Materialism seminar engages a trivium of claims that will allow me to further 
elaborate.  
 despite appearances, materialism is no less guilty than idealism of subordinating 
its textuality to the signified; to the Idea, concept, sense or truth that precedes its 
accessory, secondary, accidental inscription.  
 to challenge this hierarchy would thus have to extract materialism from its 
opposition to idealism or formalism.  
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 the political would thus find itself inscribed within the materialist text; no more a 
regional, external consideration than its subsumption into a general political 
ontology.  
The imagination, I argue here, allows us to reinterrogate Ponge’s poem cited in epigraph, 
where we ourselves and everything else is read as a dream of matter, the non- or a-signified 
textual effects of its imagination – releasing matter from its metaphysical determination as 
the fixed referent, hypokeimenon or subiectum in the referent-signifier-signified triumvirate. The 
inscription of the political in this textuality might thus disclose matter as the impolitical 
underside to the Concept, the form/matter binary and its complicity with technobiopolitical 
positionality, that is: the clearing of a site or place of non-violent resistance, of peace beyond 
metaphysical differentials of force and counterforce, power and counterpower. Deleuze 
himself points to resistance as a third term distinct from and anterior to the powers to affect 
or to be affected.17 The imagination, matter and resistance would thus constitute three third 
terms corresponding to Derrida’s trivium outlined above. The imagination’s engagement of a 
materialist general textuality anterior to proper, authentic sense and signification, before and 
beyond biopolitics, would for me constitute the real promise of new materialism.18 But can 
one fulfill this promise through the active creation of new images, where imagination is 
defined as a faculty of intuiting in the absence of the object (“Imagination is the faculty for 
representing an object even without its presence in intuition”19), by actively transforming 
the world rather than passively interpreting it? Or must one not engage this Platonist 
inversion in a controlled relation to a more radical non-site, atopian or hypertopian, a void or 
oblivion from which matter images or imagines, dreams and remembers us, from the earth 
without us, in the absence of ourselves. Imagining the earth in our absence, in the interruption the 
arche-elemental imposes on imagination, softly implores to withdraw from controlling or 
mastering its nonhuman beings – organic and inorganic, animate and inanimate – and leaves 
these vulnerable dreams of matter’s to their own oneiric resolutions. I’ll conclude with some 
tentative reflections on art’s role in this oneirology in view of letting the earth be the earth. 
 
 
In determining the non-metaphysical imagination of matter as it gives itself in khōra, one 
must examine more closely the status of myth in Plato’s thought. Derrida notes that for 
Hegel, philosophy essentially began when Aristotle abandoned mythological explanation, 
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subordinated the myth to the signified Concept and turned towards scientific and 
encyclopedic thinking, adding that Marx and Engels share this preference of Aristotle over 
Plato. In fact, as I’ll explain in a moment, Aristotle specifically sought to reintegrate khōra 
into a metaphysics of substance. But what is khōra? In the Timaeus, the sensible world of 
becoming is understood as an image of the intelligible ideas or paradigms, begotten through 
the inscription of copies of these images upon khōra, which the latter receives, admits or 
welcomes. But khōra is precisely not an underlying matter, substance or hypokeimenon that 
would take on the forms it receives; its arche-materiality is somehow ‘anterior’ to the 
philosophical oppositions of form and matter, intelligible and sensible, being and becoming 
– and not both/and but neither/nor: a neutral third. Because one can have no fixed or stable 
logos concerning the world of becoming for Plato, one must have recourse to likely accounts; 
the myth is a discourse on the image outside philosophical scientific or rational discourse. 
But the situation for khōra is even more complex: as khōra stands outside all such 
oppositions, its status in the Timaeus occurs as a myth within a myth, accessible only as in a 
dream, or through a hybrid or bastardized logos. As Derrida writes, “Khōra can be neither 
seen nor touched, neither in the proper sensible sense nor in the figurative intelligible sense. 
The dream here is signification opposed to intuition. Khōra can only be signified, but by a 
signification that is never proper or referable to some proper.”20 The authority of the sign 
itself is thus put into question; the names given to khōra in the Timaeus (imprint-bearer, 
matrix, mother, nurse, receptacle) cannot even be said to be metaphorical, as khōra resists 
any property or propriety to which these might refer. Khōra’s typography is, in other words, a 
non-significative writing, a non-causal effect of matter’s imagination. 
Aristotle, however, brings khōra back into metaphysical discourse by claiming that 
Plato had identified khōra and matter, and was thus unable to think topos or the site (what 
Heidegger translates as Ort-Raum [site-space] in our epigraph). And Aristotle’s move is quite 
paradoxical, Derrida adds, since it consists in saying that the topos belongs to neither form 
nor matter, which was precisely the case for khōra. Place can be separated from the thing 
while form and matter cannot, and Plato would have allegedly misunderstood this by 
determining place as matter, insofar as it constitutes the extension [interval, διάστημα] of 
magnitude [τοῦ μεγέθους]. “This is why Plato in the Timaeus says that matter [ῦλην] and 
space [χώραν] are the same; for the ‘participant’ [μεταληπτικὸν] and space [χώραν] are 
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identical.”21 As Derrida reminds us, however, Plato never refers to khōra as matter (hylē) in 
the Timaeus, nor as participant (metalēptikon); khōra only ‘participates’ in the intelligible 
insofar as it is invisible, and in the material insofar as it is amorphous; it gives place to these 
oppositions while being wholly outside them. Aristotle wishes to avoid a substantialization 
of place and so substantializes khōra; matter for him is never a non-being in itself, only by 
accident. In a sense, what Aristotle seems to want to guard philosophy from is a materialism 
without substance, without being, a materialism of the khōra.  
Against this “corporeitist or substantialist materialism,” Derrida identifies another 
interpretation of khōra he deems “extensionist or spatialist,” seeking to make of khōra an 
empty space or extensio.22 In his Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger however identifies both 
khōra and place (topos) in claiming that Platonic philosophy prepared or anticipated the 
Cartesian notion of ‘space’ as extension.23 However, as Derrida notes, this geometrical and 
mathematical interpretation of khōra could only concern khōra’s inscribed forms, and not 
khōra itself, which is not a homogeneous extension but “filled with powers that are neither 
similar nor evenly balanced, no part of it is in balance, it sways irregularly in every direction 
as it is shaken by those things, and being set in motion it in turn shakes them.”24 Neither 
substantialist matter nor empty space, khōra’s materialism without substance would have 
been refused from the beginning of Western philosophy to its closure. But how does this 
carry over into our discussions of imagination and resistance? Our discussion seems quite 
theoretical so far; how does it fit into praxis in approaching the promise of new materialism? 
 
 
Derrida asks a similar question in his 1995 Advances: “what time and what reason (speculative 
or practical) does a theory of the promise fall under?”25 It’s in the neighbourhood of the 
materialist promise as something of an antinomy of pure reason that I wish to steer our 
discussions of the imagination. This in fact brings us back to another, recently published 
seminar given shortly after Materialism entitled Theory and Practice (1975-6), which engages the 
work of Kant, Marx, Heidegger (and Althusser) at length.26 If the speculative dimensions of 
the materialist promise for Kant and Marx, one could say, “came to be a matter of doing and 
acting [zum Tun und Handeln],” they would vanish “like the phantom images of a dream [wie 
Schattenbilder eines Traums].”27 Marx’s 8th thesis on Feuerbach argues that all mysteries leading 
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theory into mysticism can be resolved through human practice. Derrida notes that for both 
Kant and Marx, the unification of theory of practice into something itself neither theoretical 
nor practical is still better represented by the practical. But while both philosophers, in their 
own way, subordinate the theoretical or speculative to the practical, “no more than Marx, 
Kant does not want to disqualify the speculative here, at the very moment when he says that 
practice makes its mystical or visionary clouds, oneirism, vanish.”28 Kant and Marx wish to 
banish the dream from philosophical praxis, but it could be that this move betrays a certain 
anxiety. As Heidegger notes, between the first and second editions of the Critique of Pure 
Reason, Kant would have become frightened by the possibility that the transcendental 
imagination ground the essence of the human and human practice in something unknown, 
fantastical, worrisome, abysmal.29 Kant would thus have worked to erase this notion of 
imagination as the root of both speculative and practical reason, finding comfort in pure 
reason instead as this common root. In the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals and the 
Critique of Practical Reason, written between the two editions of the first Critique, the unity of 
speculative-theoretical and practical reason is determined as pure reason itself; acting reason 
[handelnden Vernunft].30 However, even if this displacing the imagination in favour of pure 
reason allows Kant to focus on the finite rational being in general rather than the human 
being in particular (a failing for Heidegger, who wishes to reread the first Critique as 
grounding the metaphysics of the human Dasein), this would not have spared the allegedly 
more ‘logical’ second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason from a more nefarious 
psychologism and anthropologism. The questions what can I know? what must I do? what can I 
hope for? all become subsumed into an anthropology and into the question what is the human?, 
as Heidegger cites Kant: “Basically, we can classify all of these under Anthropology because 
the first three questions refer to the last.”31 This binding of a practical reason and praxis to a 
problematic anthropocentrism poses important problems for new materialism’s dialectical 
materialist inheritance, and dialectical materialism’s inheritance of a hegelian determination 
of alienation and labour. 
 Derrida points to these problems both in the Materialism and the Theory and Practice 
seminars in turning to Heidegger. As he cites the latter’s “Letter on Humanism,”  
The essence of materialism does not consist in the assertion that everything is simply 
matter but rather in a metaphysical determination according to which every being 
appears as the material of labour. The modern metaphysical essence of labour is 
anticipated in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit as the self-establishing process of 
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unconditioned production, which is the objectification of the actual through the 
human being, experienced as subjectivity. The essence of materialism is concealed in 
the essence of technology, about which much has been written but little has been 
thought.32 
 
Practice and labour are unequivocally a human matter; the spider’s web and the bee’s hive 
are not the result of labour. 33  Likewise, the same move that represses sensibility in 
imagination and frees human practice for its inquiries into hope (outside any mysticism, 
oneirism or visionary effect) determines the transformation of the world called for in the 11th 
thesis into a question of production: “the transformation of nature-raw-matter into products, is 
indeed a production, production itself.”34 Again, it’s precisely against the determination of the 
imagination as a power or production or re-production that I suggested we were best positioned to 
understand the new (or arch-ancient) materialist promise. At stake in concluding will be an 
originary material hetero-poiesis (“quite simply alterity, the fact of having one’s cause or 
possibility in another” 35 ) at the heart of any creation or imagination, anterior to the 
theory/practice, physis/tekhnè, physis/poiesis oppositions. This material underside of the 
Concept will be shown to interrupt any notion of imagination as production or power, and 
thus prepare a place, a site of non-violent resistance, where the work of art can play a role in 
letting the earth be the earth. 
 

I’d adapted Derrida above in asking what time and what reason – speculative or practical – a 
materialist theory of the promise might fall under. Displacing the imagination and the dream 
allowed both Kant and Marx to interrogate our questions of hope and of transforming the 
world into a matter of human practice, production. But Heidegger’s reading of the Kantian 
transcendental imagination poses something of a stumbling block to our analyses here, 
particularly as it relates to time, as it is defined precisely as a threefold “‘forming power’ 
[bildende Kraft]” with respect to time: the power to form images (representations of the 
present), reproduce images (the past), and anticipate images (the future): as this forming 
faculty, “the transcendental power of imagination is originary [ursprüngliche] time.”36 Heidegger 
ultimately comes to determine time in the Kantbuch as pure auto-affection; a notion of which 
Derrida has often detailed the metaphysical belonging. One would thus need to think 
imagination more radically to engage the non-metaphysical, hetero-affective, heteropoietic 
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time of the promise, of the materiality of khōra, what Derrida calls the ‘element’ that 
precedes the elementary, older than the formation of the world or the heavens, “the 
elementary insofar as it precedes time... no longer as an intelligible paradigm but as element 
of what will become the heavens or bodies.”37 In his essay “Tense,” dedicated to the work of 
John Sallis, Derrida places us well along this path by attempting to think an other time in 
relation to the dream and the imagination. The key to this other time is that one can only let 
it come, one cannot make it come or produce it. However, Derrida notes that “the modern 
notion of the imagination, notably in its Kantian or post-Kantian provenance, remains 
deeply tied to the value of production or to the opposition between the productive and the 
re-productive, between the power to produce and the power to re-produce.”38 For Sallis, the 
imagination is a power that metaphysics will have always sought to exclude, but also draws 
from. The imagination empowers and activates metaphysics, but also constitutes a certain 
unpower or finitude, a passive division of non-self-presence that metaphysics will have 
sought to repress. The history of metaphysics would thus have constituted a dynamics of 
power and counterpower, force and counterforce, attempting to stabilize this dynamic 
relation between imagination and metaphysics. In Kant, notably, “the empowering power of 
the imagination finds itself in its turn disqualified and excluded from the ‘domain,’ in other 
words, from the dynasty, from the field of power that is practical reason.”39 Practical reason 
thus stabilizes its dynamic relation to the imagination by distancing itself from it. For 
Derrida, however, this relation of stabilization is inseparable from a semantics of being; one 
ought think stabilization as taking place against a background of a certain destabilization, a 
chaotization that would not be the in-stability of any being or presence, but rather an 
unpresence or nonbeing. The condition of the imagination would thus be “a certain thread 
tied between nonbeing (the beyond of being) and time[.]”40 Hence, the dynamics of the 
imagination “lodge within themselves the (incalculable) possibility of the incalculable, and 
thus a singular debility, an essential impotence – one could also say, an irreducible 
finitude.”41 And thus the imagination comes to be thought along side the other third term 
that is the arche-material khōra, only perceivable in images or dreams.  
From the moment there is nothing but images, and from the moment there is no 
image for χώρα, the power of imagination as ‘power of spacing’ finds in χώρα (that 
is, the place of espacement itself) at once its ultimate recourse and its ultimate limit, 
its condition of possibility and of impossibility, its possibility as impossibility, its 
power as un-power.  
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* 
*     * 
The time of khōra is that of the other time, otherwise than being. How do matters stand with 
respect to space, site or place? It’s along these lines that I wish to conclude in situating the 
role of the work of art in preparing a site of resistance to technobiopolitical positionality. As 
is well known, one of the biggest changes in Heidegger’s thought can be seen in the shift 
between Sein und Zeit and Zeit und Sein; one can no longer hold that being and time are, but 
can only say ‘es gibt Sein,’ ‘es gibt Zeit’ [It gives being, it gives time]. Notably, one of the few 
concessions Heidegger ever made about a correction in his thought is that “the attempt in 
Being and Time, section 70, to derive human spatiality from temporality is untenable.”42 This 
placing of spatiality on the same playing field as time will give us much to dwell on, as for 
Derrida it is not unrelated to a similar shift in accent in Heidegger’s thought from “The 
Origin of the Work of Art” to the “Art and Space” essay cited in epigraph.43 “The Origin of 
the Work of Art” problematically concludes in determining all art as a subset of Dichtung or 
poetry, with Heidegger deeming it “questionable whether the essence of poetry... can 
adequately be thought in terms of imagination and the power of imagining [imagination und 
Einbildungskraft].”44 Heidegger does not mean here to reduce architecture, the visual arts and 
music to poesy [Poesie], but rather to a language that brings forth beings as beings. “Where 
language is not present, as in the being of stones, plants or animals, there is also no openness 
of beings, and consequently no openness either of that which is not a being [des Nichtseienden] 
or of emptiness.”45 So while Heidegger wishes to uncover the thingliness, one could say the 
materiality of the work of art anterior to its determination as hypokeimenon, subiectum or the 
hylē/morphē distinction, a site precisely where materiality would come to limit the power of 
imagination, he stumbles in determining this site in terms of (human) language. In this sense, 
both poesy and Dichtung would correspond to what Ponge calls a world of words, that of a 
finite universe, finite as conditioned by the human Dasein’s finitude, its authentic and 
ownmost relation to time, death, others, the world. Here, it’s unclear how much the work of 
art can break with its determination as human praxis, production, power, creation. But 
matter’s non-significative textuality is indefinite, to return to Ponge, an indefiniteness that 
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doesn’t metaphysically oppose itself to the finite as the infinite, but I think calls more in the 
key of an infinite, ahuman, material finitude.  
It’s not that the question of language is absent from “Art and Space,” but it is not 
presented as the origin of the work of art. Heidegger wishes to show how art gives way to a 
space or site of dwelling foreclosed, made uninhabitable by the technoscientific notion of 
space as extension – prepared, let’s recall, by khōra and topos – ultimately as something to be 
mathematically measured, evaluated and controlled; the space of practice and commerce. We 
saw Heidegger cite Aristotle in determining the topos or Ort-Raum as something difficult and 
hard to grasp. Paralleling Kant’s fright before the nonhuman dimensions of the imagination, 
Heidegger draws on Goethe in describing one’s awe, fear and terror in interrogating the 
arche-phenomenon of space: “an awe to the point of anxiety [Scheu bis zur Angst]. For behind 
space, so it will appear, nothing more is given [gibt es nichts mehr] to which it could be traced 
back. Before space there is no retreat to something else.”46 We can only ask what space is 
from space itself and, as Derrida interprets it, “it is because there is nothing before or behind 
it and that it says nothing that we are cut off from it. We are thus cut off from space... we are 
in space cut off from space.”47 Space comes into play for Heidegger from the inclosing, 
excluding border around the artwork’s heterogeneously formed matter. It is from the work’s 
limit – its material border that the site is released, given its freedom: “Räume ist Freigabe von 
Orten”; and I recall that everything at stake here depends on understanding matter as a limit 
to imagination as a power, where we find ourselves cut off from the elementary, the earth, and 
are only called upon to let it be. The arche-material khōra gives way to space, to the spatial 
work or image by withdrawing from it; the materiality that withdraws from the work [œuvre] 
attests to its unworking or inoperativity [déœuvrement]. This relation to a non-site, an atopian 
or hypertopian void is ultimately what disempowers any materialism understood as a 
technological metaphysics of labour or production; devitalizes any biopolitics understood as 
a dialectics of force and counterforce, power and counterpower. But a space here opens for 
art to gesture towards the impolitical underside of technobiopolitical positionality and its 
reduction of all organic and inorganic matter to their calculability, productibility and use 
value. Impolitical only because the finitude and vulnerability of matter’s dreams offers no 
ethico-political programme, it only calls out to let beings be, release nature’s general 
oneirological writing, and let the earth be the earth. Here, Heidegger’s notion of meditation 
or mindfulness (besinnung) as Gelassenheit (which Derrida renders as “calm, abandonment, 
 12 
serenity, opening that lets be,”48) allows us to conclude in thinking this site in the key of the 
imagination: “In meditation we go towards a site [Ort] from out of which first opens the 
space [Raum] traversed at any given time by all our doing and leaving undone [Tun und 
Lassen].”49 
March, 2018  
                                                        
1 Francis Ponge, Nouveau Recueil (Paris, Gallimard, 1967), p. 177. “Probably, each and all – and we ourselves – 
are nothing but immediate dreams of divine Matter:/ the textual products of its prodigious imagination./ And 
thus, in a sense, one could say that the whole of nature, humans included, is nothing but a writing; but a writing 
of a certain genre; a non-significative writing, in that it refers to no system of signification; that it is a question of 
an indefinite universe: properly speaking immense, without measures./ While the world of words is a finite 
universe.” Where no published translation exists, translations from the French will be our own.  
2 “Place is thought to be something important and hard to grasp.” Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle: The 
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